Date: Sat, 25 May 1996 13:56:32 -0400
To: Athena Discuss
Subject: Re: Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence
FISHERGM@jmu.edu wrote:
>
> S F, I hope you don't get too mad at me, but I can't resist
> commenting on the statement "absence of evidence isn't
> evidence of absence". This is undoubtedly true, but (to
> put it in Popperian terms), along with conjectures, which
> may be of any sort whatever, many people feel there should
> also a commitment to refuting (or "falsifying") a conjecture,
> and a willingness to seriously consider falsifying evidence.
> (Cf. Popper's book *Conjectures and Refutations*).
Of course. But absence of evidence cannot be considered
falsifying of anything.
> You mention someone who is trying to provide an explanation
> of the geologist's results which would not require the more
> ancient dating of the Sphinx, and/or would support a later date.
> On the face of it, it seems to me that this won't constitute a
> falsification of the early date theory, but rather just an
> alternative explanation., leaving it up toeach individual
> to makte his or her own choice of what to believe.
I characterized it as a "competing theory". It would hardly
constitute falsification of the Schoch-West theory, I agree.
And as always, when there are competing hypotheses to explain
the same data, one leans to the one which seems more likely
or plausible. I agree that different observers might have
different views as to relative likelihood. Sometimes those
who are dishonest will lean to the *less* likely hypothesis,
if that accords better with cherished prior belief,
trusting to the cover provided by the fact that honest people
could in any case differ.
>
> What would constitute a falsification of the geologist's theory,
> do you think?
In principle, to falsify the theory one would have to
attack the asserted facts and/or the asserted arguments.
I will say no more since I do not have the relevant
scholarly papers at my disposal.
> And then again, Popper's conjecture and refutation description
> of scientific procedure may not be applicable to historical
> investigations of this sort, in the way it sometimes is
> to ahistorical subjects like mathematics, physics, chemistry,
> and I guess engineering.
I don't see why not. The geologist appeals to a general
phenomenon of which the sphinx is but one instance.
The explanation of scientific phenomena likewise invokes
the general to explain the particular; and as with
scientific explanations in general, the particular case
that doesn't fit may be used to falsify the general
explanation. There is difficulty where historical events
are concerned (it is the same in court cases) because
it is not always possible to recreate the predicates
required by the general theory asserted to see whether the
particular instance contemplated under the theory fits
or doesn't fit. But this difficulty does not in my
view invalidate the general scientific meta-construct so well
characterized by Popper, or its applicability in
the field of history or jurisprudence.
>
> I'm not sure where this leaves the question of dating the
> Sphinx, but there you have my comments on "absence of
> evidence isn't evidence of absence*. It seems to me
> that while this is true, some further steps have to be
> taken to prevent this statement from becoming something
> like "you can entertain any hypothesis whatsoever for
> which no *definitively* contradicting (or falsifying) evidence
> can be found". This may also be true, but it seems to
> me that there are dangers connected with such an attitude.
I don't think so. Hypotheses, by their very nature, contain
the seeds of their own potential destruction. You cannot
assert a well-posed hypothesis without also revealing the
ground on which the hypothesis may be attacked. Therefore,
I see no danger in hypothesis-proliferation as such. The
ones that are untenable will quickly be abandoned, and the
viable ones will give us something to think about. It is
in the process of testing each "viable" hypothesis that
scientific advance takes place. I think the greater
danger lies in getting complacent about an orthodox
received view, which then becomes a distorting lens through
which contradicting evidence is viewed. That is not
scientific. If you want to defeat a competing hypothesis,
you must do it fairly and squarely... No resorting to
argumentum ad hominem (eg. questioning Diop's trustworthiness)
or argumentum ab auctoritate (eg. why don't we accept the
"expert" opinion of various past Nazis), or
such out-and-out dishonesty as misrepresenting what your
opponent asserts (eg. Mr. Daniels' pathetic straw man
assertion--ALL Afrocentrists claim that ALL Greeks are
plagiarists--which he then gleefully but foolishly attempts
to knock down). Thank you for so far steering clear of
the above, even though your prejudices and preconceptions
are plain, and your fancy footwork in defense of the
received view dazzling to behold, but ultimately unavailing.
> Gordon Fisher fishergm@jmu.edu
Regards,
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